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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 23 and 24, December 1983

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6 March 1984

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS  
COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES  
Nos. 23 and 24, December 1983

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## IMPORTANCE OF NONFERROUS METALLURGY TO ECONOMY, NATIONAL DEFENSE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 83 pp 17-22

[Article by USSR Minister of Nonferrous Metallurgy P. Lomako: "Nonferrous Metals: The Bread of Industry"]

[Text] Nonferrous metallurgy is one of the key sectors of the Soviet economy. It determines the technical progress of Soviet industry and above all of electrical equipment, electronics, computer technology and atomic power engineering. Mines and concentration enterprises are located on the territories of all fraternal republics from the Arctic tundra to the deserts of Central Asia, from the Carpathian Mountains to the Pacific Ocean.

We now have the opportunity to obtain practically any nonferrous, rare or precious metal. Even today our sector extracts 74 chemical elements of the D. I. Mendeleyev periodic system from the interior of the earth (in the prewar year of 1940 only 34 were being extracted).

There is probably not one area of the USSR's national economy where nonferrous metals do not find an application. During 1976-1982 alone our plants and factories mastered the production of more than just a single thousand of new kinds of products and economical forms of rolled stock. The production of superstrength alloys, especially refractory and corrosion-resisting alloys and other materials with unique properties is developing successfully. Space metallurgy is progressing confidently. Especially pure metals and alloys have been obtained in the "Splav" [Alloy] and "Kristall" [Crystal] furnaces aboard orbital laboratories. It was in space that two inseparable neighbors among the Earth's minerals--lead and zinc--were "joined" for the first time.

The application of nonferrous metals in military affairs is many-sided. They are simply irreplaceable in the sophisticated equipment constantly coming into the inventory of the Army, Air Force and Navy. We cannot get by without nonferrous metals and special alloys in a modern rocket, in an atomic reactor or in a supersonic fighter.

Our sector has covered a long and difficult path. Suffice it to say that before 1917 deposits of aluminum, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, bismuth and antimony, not to mention the rare metals, were unknown in Russia. Czarist

Russia in essence did not have its own nonferrous metallurgy; foreign capitalists held undivided sway in its economy. More than 70 percent of all funds invested in the production of nonferrous metals belonged to them. British, French and Belgian concessionaires were the actual proprietors of the few copper plants. Deposits were developed by the entrepreneurs in a predatory manner and manual labor primarily was employed.

It was only after the October Revolution that there began a swift development of nonferrous metallurgy, which in the years of Soviet power was transformed into a modern, highly mechanized production bringing together hundreds of mines and concentrating mills and plants.

In the stern Great Patriotic War times the sector's toilers made a ponderable contribution to the victory over fascist Germany. Tens of thousands of nonferrous metallurgy workers went off to defend the Motherland with guns in hand and many performed exploits at war fronts. Following the victory over the enemy soldiers returned to their enterprises, and among them today are eight Heroes of the Soviet Union and four full wearers of the Order of Glory. There are 140 war participants working on the ministry staff.

I would like to mention HSU Vladimir Yakovlevich Timoshenko among the former frontlinesmen. He is a hereditary metallurgist: His father Yakov Vanifat'yevich worked many years in the Nikitovka Ore Combine, the Achkatauskiy Mining and Concentrating Combine and the Dzhida Wolfram-Molybdenum Combine. A party member since 1939, Vladimir Yakovlevich participated in the Battle of Moscow and in fighting to liberate the Ukraine and Belorussia; he made the assault crossing of the Dnepr; and he fought the fascists on Polish and Czechoslovak soil. V. Timoshenko returned to nonferrous metallurgy after the Great Patriotic War and did much for the development of the wolfram-molybdenum subsector. He worked many long years in Kirghizia as the director of the Khaydarkan [sic] Mercury Combine and the Kadamzhay Antimony Combine. Now the Great Patriotic War veteran is giving his extensive life and production experience to the work with cadres and the youth. There are many such people in our sector.

But the victory over the enemy also brought those people closer together who remained in the rear and who demonstrated courage, staunchness and valor in an unparalleled battle for metal and bread, fuel and raw materials, and the production of powerful Soviet weapons. The front demanded an ever-increasing amount of combat equipment and ammunition, with aluminum, lead, copper, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, wolfram and other metals needed for its manufacture. The front received these products, despite the fact that at the beginning of the war the fascist German troops destroyed such important enterprises as the Nikitovka Mercury Combine, the Tikhvin bauxite mines and the Tyrnyauz Wolfram-Molybdenum Combine, which were of great importance for the defense industry.

Equipment of the Dnepr, Volkhov and Tikhvin aluminum plants was disassembled and shipped out over a 1½ month period under very difficult conditions. All nonferrous metallurgy enterprises then located in Moscow and Leningrad were evacuated rapidly to the east.

...On the night of 15/16 October 1941 B. I. Orlovskiy, deputy people's commissar for nonferrous metallurgy, spoke to shop chiefs of the Kol'chugino Aluminum Plant and read the State Defense Committee order about the plant's evacuation to the Urals. The Kol'chugino personnel had to set up several processing plants in Revda, Orsk, Kamensk-Uralsk and Verkhnyaya Salda. Engineers and workers dismantled the equipment in large units. This complicated the loading and unloading operations, but on the other hand considerably accelerated equipment assembly at the new location. Displaying mass labor heroism, workers, engineering-technical personnel and the party organizations of the evacuated enterprises set up production of goods important for the front's needs in fantastically short times.

The days and nights before equipment of the Kol'chugino Plant imeni S. Ordzhonikidze, evacuated to the city of Revda, began operation are especially vividly imprinted in memory. The complicated production of thin-walled tubes for the radiators and fuel and oil lines of aircraft and tanks was set up in a period of several months. People would not leave the shops for days on end and, as always, the party members were in front. The equipment was assembled in an unbelievably short time period of 18 days. In peacetime such an amount of work would have required more than five months. On 29 December 1941 the Narkomat [people's commissariat] reported start-up of the Revda Plant to the State Defense Committee.

The manufacture of products at the Kamensk-Uralsk plant for the processing of nonferrous metals and at other enterprises was organized in the very same short time periods. Equipment of the Severonikel' Combine, which was in the frontline zone of the Kola Peninsula, was rebased from Monchegorsk to Norilsk and the Yuzhuralnikel' [Combine] in a period of 1½ months.

The Ural Aluminum Plant expanded on the basis of the evacuated equipment. It was here that all the burden of supplying the aviation industry with aluminum fell during 1942-1943.

Geological work was stepped up sharply for strengthening the raw material base of nonferrous metallurgy. Construction of new mining and concentrating enterprises on the basis of surveyed deposits was accelerated. The Chorukh-Dayron, Koytash and Lyangar wolfram-molybdenum mines in Kazakhstan and many others producing alloying metals (which went primarily for the production of armor and gun tubes) were built in the most compressed time periods. While the survey of deposits previously lasted 2-3 years, it was accomplished in 5-6 months in wartime.

The Great Patriotic War graphically showed how great the importance of nonferrous metallurgy is in winning victory over the enemy. Thanks to the party's constant concern and attention we were able to produce twice the military equipment and ammunition in the war years than fascist Germany and its minions.

The Soviet government highly esteemed the labor of nonferrous metallurgy workers during the war. More than 3,000 persons were presented with USSR orders



and medals and 73 workers received the title of State Prize laureate. Challenge red banners of the State Defense Committee for selfless labor of workers, technicians, engineers and employees were presented to 14 nonferrous metallurgy enterprises.

More than 38 years have passed since the Soviet people's great victory over fascist Germany. During these years the sector has surpassed the prewar level many times over both in quantity and assortment of manufactured products. Considerable progress was achieved in the 10th Five-Year Plan. Our country's national economy received nonferrous metals and other materials worth several billion rubles more than those in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Major enterprises have been placed in operation--the Nadezhdinskiy Metallurgical Plant in the Norilsk Mining and Smelting Combine, the Nikolayevskiy Alumina Plant and the Tadzhikskiy Aluminum Plant--and production has been expanded at the Dzhezkazgan, Balkhash and many other enterprises. New capacities have begun operating at the Zhayrem, Novo-Zolotushinskiy, Orlovskiy and Zapadnyy Tekeliyskiy complex ore deposits of Kazakhstan and at the copper-nickel deposits of the Norilsk Ore Region.

Nonferrous metallurgy has entered the 11th Five-Year Plan with a good surplus, figuratively speaking, with a high production potential and experienced cadres of workers, technicians, engineers and administrators. But in accomplishing tasks of the five-year plan for the USSR's economic and social development, our sector has to surmount certain complexities involving both the accelerated rates of capital construction and the wide adoption of new equipment and technology. The past year of 1982 was no exception: It was very strenuous. Nevertheless, the sector's toilers fulfilled plans for production of the most important nonferrous metals; molybdenum and zinc concentrates; rare-metal, hard-alloy and carbon materials; and consumer goods. Quotas for product sales and for increasing labor productivity and profits also were implemented.

It must be said that there was an increase in the processing volumes of raw material and output of articles with the use of progressive production processes. More than 190,000 tons of nonferrous metals were included in processing from semifinished products, substandard raw materials and wastes.

It is unquestionable that these successes are the fruits of vital labor by collectives and party organizations of mining, concentrating and metallurgical enterprises and of all sector workers. Seventeen socialist competition winners were presented with Challenge Red Banners of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU and Komsomol Central Committee. I would like to mention the Alaverdi and Dzhezkazgan combines, the Krasnoyarsk and Kirovabad aluminum plants, the Nikitovka Mercury Combine, the Zaporozhye and Berezniki titanium-magnesium combines, the Kolchugino plant, the Yakutalmaz and Lenzoloto associations, Moscow Hard Alloy Combine, Moscow Electrode plant and others. Forty-six collectives were presented with Challenge Red Banners of the ministry and central committee of the metallurgical industry workers union.

Party members are in the advance guard of the struggle for high production efficiency. They demonstrate models of selfless labor and lead the collectives toward achieving outstanding production indicators. Names widely known

in nonferrous metallurgy are those of CPSU members Aleksey Ivanovich Sviridonov and Viktor Dmitriyevich Zhilovskiy, brigade leaders at the Bratsk Aluminum Plant and the Zaparozhye Titanium-Magnesium Combine, Heroes of Socialist Labor, USSR State Prize laureates and deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Faskhetdin Farkheyevich Fakhрутdinov, leader of a tunneling brigade of the Zabaykalskoye Association and USSR State Prize laureate; and Hero of Socialist Labor Avenir Nikolayevich Konyayev, leader of a brigade of wire drawers of the Artemovskiy Nonferrous Metals Processing Plant. The brigades they head are among the 18 foremost brigades in the sector. In response to resolutions of the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum, they came out with a patriotic initiative to unfold 1983 socialist competition under the motto "Guaranteed overfulfillment of production quotas each day." The good initiative found broad support among the masses and over 18,000 brigades joined in competition under this motto.

It is gratifying to note that many socialist competition leaders in the sector went through a good Army or Navy school of indoctrination. The overwhelming majority of former privates and seamen, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] and officers work with vim and inspiration at plants, combines and mines. Only good words can be heard addressed to them. The Army and Navy alumni not only work selflessly but also perform much military-patriotic work among metallurgists at the enterprise. Young workers study in motor vehicle and motorcycle clubs, technical sports clubs, parachute clubs and naval clubs. Predraft-age persons receive good knowledge and skills here in preparing for duty in the Armed Forces. The past war's veterans also make a considerable contribution toward the military-patriotic indoctrination of young metallurgists.

But in speaking of the sector's achievements it is impossible not to mention our existing problems and difficulties. An increase in the production of nonferrous, rare and precious metals now is achieved at the cost of very high and ever-growing expenditures of labor, time and money. The sector's ore base is developing under difficult conditions and there is a drop in the content of nonferrous metals in ores at deposits being worked. The depth of open-pit and underground mines has reached 300-400 and 1,000-1,200 m respectively. The volumes of dead rock involved in producing one ton of ore have risen. I will give the following comparison: The yearly volume of mining exceeds 2.4 billion tons of rock mass (ore and overburden). If this ore and rock were to be loaded in rolling stock, it would stretch from the Earth to the Moon! Nonferrous metals are truly our Motherland's irreplaceable riches. Even today to obtain one ton of copper or nickel we are forced to take many hundreds of tons of ore and country rock from the depths! This means it must be a matter of accelerating scientific-technical progress in mining production and the adoption of high-capacity mining equipment and highly effective mining systems. The enormous quantities of low-grade ores extracted from the depths must be crushed and subjected to flotation, concentrates obtained, and metals smelted while separating out the greatest number of associated components.

The prospecting and survey of deposits and the extraction, concentration and metallurgical conversion of raw materials represent very labor- and capital-intensive processes. Moreover, it must be taken into account that ore

reserves in the depths are not unlimited and for this reason the problems of comprehensive economy of nonferrous metals are of primary importance. This is emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Intensifying the Work for Economy and Rational Use of Raw Materials, Fuel-Energy and Other Material Resources." Questions of the economy of metals in the national economy now have been elevated to the rank of state and party policy. Speaking at the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said: "Economy and a zealous attitude toward the people's wealth now is a question of the reality of our plans."

Economy for us above all is a prevention of losses in industrial conversions within the sector, very strict thrift in the processing and machinebuilding sectors and assurance of timely and quality return of their scrap and tailings. Unfortunately, the efficiency of using nonferrous metals in the country's national economy in the manufacture of machines, equipment and various metal structures and instruments is still low. According to data of the USSR TsSU [Central Statistical Administration], some 28 percent of nonferrous metals goes into waste in processing rolled stock for the USSR as a whole, and up to 22 percent goes into waste in the preparation of nonferrous casting.

Our products are not being used thriftily at some enterprises. How can matters be corrected? In my view, the chief condition for a more rational use of nonferrous metals in machinebuilding is the extensive introduction of economical production processes, wastefree technology, and scientifically grounded standards for expenditure of such metals.

But this is only one aspect of the matter. An important source for increasing the production of nonferrous metals is a wider collection and processing of their scrap and waste, which is being handled by our secondary metallurgy. It has some 300 shops and sites connected with the receipt and primary processing of the scrap and wastes of nonferrous metals, and 16 enterprises producing alloys from secondary metallurgical raw materials. Their output is very significant. Last year, for example, hundreds of thousands of tons of scrap and wastes were procured, from which thousands of tons of nonferrous metals and alloys were obtained. This noticeably reduces the labor inputs and the consumption of electrical energy and raw materials. Suffice it to say that the expenditure of electrical energy is reduced 7-8 times and that of raw materials 6 times for producing one ton of aluminum alloys from secondary raw materials, and labor inputs are halved.

The growth in production of nonferrous metals from secondary raw materials depends directly on the quality of scrap turned in to industry and its separation by kinds and quality. In a number of instances, however, specialized equipment still is lacking. This leads to a situation where, for example, only copper is extracted from low-grade wastes containing copper and there is an annual loss of up to 15,000 tons of zinc, 1,500 tons of tin and 67,000-70,000 tons of aluminum.

How are the rejected parts of electronic gear and electric light production being used? Everyone knows that nonferrous, rare and precious metals are used

in manufacturing these products. At the majority of enterprises, however, the rejected parts are not separated and are turned over to Soyuzvtortsvetmet [All-Union Secondary Nonferrous Metals Procurement, Processing, and Sales Industrial Association] in bulk, as they say. For this reason many nonferrous metals contained in these parts are depreciated and lost.

Questions of a zealous, economical attitude toward nonferrous and rare metals and articles made therefrom, and of the collection and sorting of scrap metal also have a direct relationship to our Armed Forces, which are outfitted with the most sophisticated equipment in which wide use is made of the products of nonferrous metallurgy. To include the nonferrous metals of articles which have served their life into the national economic turnover is an important party and state task.

Major tasks are set for nonferrous metallurgy in the 11th Five-Year Plan by the Basic Directions of the USSR's Economic and Social Development for 1981-1985 and for the Period up to 1990, approved by the 26th CPSU Congress. The raw material base of existing enterprises must be strengthened and assured of further outstripping development.

There is a demand to considerably increase the production of aluminum, copper, nickel, cobalt, zinc, lead, titanium, magnesium, precious metals, as well as wolfram and molybdenum concentrates, niobium and other alloying metals.

The tasks set for the sector in the 11th Five-Year Plan demand a most rapid development of new deposits surveyed in the Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan and many other regions of our immense Motherland and an expansion of our well-known enterprises such as the Norilsk, Tyrnyauz, Severonikel' and Karagaylinskiy combines, the Yakutalmaz and Yeniseyboloto associations and so on. Here is where there is a special need for skilled builders, mechanics, drivers and other specialists who have served in the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy. One always can rely on people who have received a good ideological and physical conditioning in our Armed Forces; they will not shirk any kind of difficulty or test of courage and they can be entrusted with the most responsible work.

Inspired by the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 and June 1983 party Central Committee plenums, toilers of nonferrous metallurgy will do everything necessary for successful fulfillment of 11th Five-Year Plan quotas and will make a worthy contribution toward strengthening our Motherland's economic and defense might.

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## COL GEN REPIN ON CRITICISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 83 pp 40-46

[Article by Col Gen I. Repin, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Criticism and Self-Criticism are a Reliable Means for Improving Matters"]

[Text] When one analyzes results of the report-election party meetings and the progress of conferences, one notes their distinguishing features: the party members' desire to assess critically what has been achieved, to examine thoroughly the content and effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work and organizing work by party organizations and elective agencies, and to identify new opportunities for perfecting combat and political training and for strengthening military discipline. This feature reflects to a considerable extent the trend which was intensified after the 26th party congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums toward broad development of criticism and self-criticism and toward a stricter, more exacting assessment of the work both of every CPSU member and candidate member and of the party organization as a whole.

Criticism and self-criticism represent a tested and effective method for exercising party leadership, for indoctrinating people and for identifying and remedying deficiencies, and they represent a reliable means for improving matters. This method was adopted by our party from the first days of its birth. V. I. Lenin highly valued the enormous opportunities of criticism and self-criticism. He taught that it is the party members' duty not to be silent about weaknesses of their movement but to criticize them openly in order to get rid of them faster and more drastically. Vladimir Il'ich emphasized that self-criticism is unquestionably necessary for any living, vital party.

In all stages of its history our party constantly showed concern for the development of criticism and self-criticism and for increasing their effectiveness. This was widely reflected in resolutions of party congresses and of its Central Committee plenums and in CPSU Central Committee decrees. For example, the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On the Status of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambov Oblast Party Organization," adopted in 1975, has a fundamental, partywide importance. The decree examines the role of criticism and self-criticism and emphasizes that they acquire more and more

importance with a growth in the scope and complexity of tasks being accomplished in building communism.

Criticism and self-criticism are fixed in the CPSU Bylaws as a standard of party life. The Bylaws state that every party member is obligated to develop criticism and self-criticism, boldly expose deficiencies and see that they are remedied, fight sham efficiency, conceit and self-complacency, give a resolute rebuff to any attempt at suppressing criticism, and speak out against any action doing harm to the party and state. The CPSU Bylaws give the party member the right to criticize any party member, regardless of the post he holds, at party meetings, conferences, congresses and committee plenums. The Bylaws provide for strict measures of party influence including even expulsion from the CPSU's ranks with respect to party members who have allowed a suppression of criticism or persecution therefor.

Thanks to steps being taken by the party, criticism and self-criticism now have been established as a standard not only of party life, but also of state and public life. This was reflected in our country's Basic Law. The USSR Constitution in particular obligates appointed persons to review citizens' suggestions and statements, give responses to them and make the necessary decisions within established time periods. Persecution for criticism is prohibited in the USSR. Moreover, the law provides that those who dare take such actions are to be held liable.

Criticism and self-criticism assume special significance now when the party is orienting managers and all Soviet citizens on a more realistic analysis of work results, an objective assessment of what has been achieved and development of a feeling of healthy dissatisfaction with what has been done. Party Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V. Andropov emphasized at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "The bolder and more specifically party members speak out in discussing urgent problems of party and national life and the more actively they take part in fulfilling the decisions made, the more successfully our party will be able to fulfill its historic mission." The Plenum pointed out the need to make skilled use of criticism, not to depart from a position of principle and objectivity, and keep the implementation of workers' critical remarks and suggestions under strict control.

The development of criticism and self-criticism is connected in the closest way with a large number of factors, and above all with intraparty work. It is generally known that in directing party organizations at a comprehensive improvement of their internal life and every possible activation of intraparty work, the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized the importance of establishing a healthy moral climate, an atmosphere of self-criticism, and an atmosphere of intolerance toward deficiencies, passiveness and indifference in every party collective. This is the kind of atmosphere which contributes to an increase in party members' activeness and in their responsibility for their own work and for everything done in the party.

The CPSU's demands concerning the need for further development of criticism and self-criticism also relate fully to the work of political entities and party organizations of our Armed Forces. This was reemphasized at the



6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. "In following guidelines of the party congress," state the documents of this conference, "we must establish even more persistently a spirit of self-criticism and irreconcilability toward deficiencies in all party organizations. Attempts at suppressing or ignoring criticism must receive severe party condemnation."

In conformity with provisions of the party Bylaws and the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, party organizations are fighting resolutely against negative phenomena, infractions of state and military discipline, conceit, negligence, indifference, eyewash, instances of indulgences and oversimplification in combat training, and deficiencies which harm combat readiness. Party organizations use the light of criticism to illuminate flaws in the organization of the training process and troop duties, in party-political work and in the personnel's material and everyday support. They take into account that criticism of orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs is not allowed under Army and Navy conditions.

A majority of our district's party organizations display objective concern that the tested method of criticism and self-criticism be established firmly in their life and work. One of the proofs of this is the character and mood of party conferences now being held everywhere. Here party members are boldly uncovering shortcomings in the personnel's training and indoctrination, in the work of party committees and party bureaus and in political indoctrination work. In an atmosphere of a free exchange of opinions they are critically interpreting the work of their own party collectives and every party member, analyzing the reasons for omissions, and outlining steps aimed at a further improvement in the party organizations' organizing and ideological indoctrination work and a reinforcement of their influence on an increase in combat readiness, a strengthening of military discipline and on all aspects of the life of units and subunits.

This year, probably as never before, party members are expressing many businesslike proposals suggested by life itself, and almost every other one involves an improvement in combat readiness and in the soldiers' combat proficiency. This reflects the patriotic desire of party members to respond with action to the call to vigilance, to curbing the forces of militarism and to disrupting the aggressive plans of imperialism which sounded in the Statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov. Party members and candidate members are sharply criticizing instances of infractions of military discipline and facts attesting to an absence of proper initiative in implementing demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense about reinforcing efficiency and order in certain military collectives and their leaders.

That very tone was inherent to many party meetings held in subunits of the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division, and a number of air units. Here, in a fundamental, exacting discussion, party members evaluated the personal contribution of each of their comrades toward implementing resolutions of the 26th party congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums and toward



fulfilling the missions facing the subunits. As a rule the speakers specifically pointed out what caused particular deficiencies in a person's work or behavior, what depends here on the person himself and what depends on the party organization, and in what way matters can be corrected resolutely.

Results of the past training year and the reports and elections of party agencies which were held provided many examples of high effectiveness of criticism and self-criticism and of their considerable role in the life and work of party and military collectives. The following example is typical. This year the unit where Lt Col V. Teplov is the party committee secretary became outstanding for the tenth time in a row. As the commander noted at the report-election party meeting, great credit for this went to the party organization. As befitting political fighters, its members always set the tone in everything, act as organizers and leaders of mass socialist competition and as champions of new things, support those who are in the forefront in every way, disseminate their experience and do battle from a principled position against negative phenomena which degrade combat readiness if only to the slightest extent. The party organization persistently instills in all party members a respect for the opinions and suggestions of comrades in the party, and it creates conditions for the development of criticism and self-criticism. This is why the role of criticism is so perceptible in establishing in the collective a spirit of self-criticism and irreconcilability toward shortcomings, and a desire not to rest on one's laurels but head for new goals and achieve more.

It is generally known that criticism is strong by its publicity, by the indication of specific culprits, and by the well-conceived nature of suggestions and measures for remedying deficiencies, but this is not considered in some places. At some meetings, for example, no exacting evaluation was made of each party member's contribution toward fulfilling resolutions of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum in analyzing the status of ideological work. In the party organization headed by Capt A. Yurenkov, for example, the entire discussion reduced to a reminder of the well-known Plenum requirement that ideological work is a matter for the entire party, which means every member of the party. The party collective has comrades who willingly quote this thesis but assume that it is not they who must perform political work among the soldiers; it is someone else who must do it for them.

There also are facts of a direct infringement of the party members' rights at report-election meetings, and here is one of them. When Sgt O. Frunze, a deputy platoon commander and CPSU member, spoke about the battery's successes everyone listened to his words calmly. But as soon as he said that some leaders were preparing unconscientiously for combat and political training classes he was immediately stopped by battery commander and CPSU member Maj A. Shestitko, who said: "That isn't your concern, Comrade Sergeant." "Since the matter in question is a party matter, that means it is also my concern as a party member," objected the CPSU member reasonably and he continued his speech. Then Shestitko crudely interrupted him a second time. Party Member P. Zyablin, a unit staff representative who was attending the meeting, had to correct the comrade who had taken offense.

Everything which had been said prompted us to analyze the progress of reports and elections in party organizations more thoroughly and to study objectively whether or not criticism, the weapon of great force in the fight against deficiencies, had been zeroed in, as they say. In the district political directorate we heard reports on this score from V. Kirichenko and A. Shelest, officers of political entities. We determined steps aimed at raising the ideological and organizational level of meetings and at instilling in party members self-criticism, principle and exactingness toward each other.

It stands to reason that the development of criticism and self-criticism is a process which cannot be restricted to the framework of the preparation and conduct of a report-election campaign. Such qualities of party members as a critical approach to an analysis of their work, a healthy dissatisfaction with what has been done and irreconcilability toward shortcomings are shaped in the daily activity of party organizations. Our own experience convinces us that, along with meetings, party members' accounts and reports about their fulfillment of their own party and official duty serve as the most expedient and effective form of work to develop these qualities. A hearing of such reports and accounts has become a firm practice in a majority of party organizations. I will refer to an example.

At one time certain leaders, through whose fault interruptions were allowed in the personnel's weapons and technical training and military discipline was relaxed, were subjected to acute criticism at a party meeting in the party organization where Maj A. Gubchik was one of the party committee members. The party members suggested hearing accounts from those leaders at a party committee session about how they were correcting the state of affairs in their areas. Soon these comrades reported to the party committee about what help they were giving to those officers who did not have sufficient mastery of the methodology for training and indoctrinating soldiers, and about their personal contribution toward improving the personnel's weapons and technical training and toward strengthening military discipline. There was substantial benefit from these measures as well as others taken here. The military collective gradually ceased being among the laggards: Indicators in combat training improved and efficiency and discipline rose. Seeing how significant the party members' reports and accounts were in developing their self-criticism and irreconcilability toward shortcomings, the party committee began to make more frequent use of this form of intraparty work.

Criticism and self-criticism represent a single whole that is deeply interrelated. And if, let's say, some leader assumes the pose of an infallible worker, loses a sense of reality in evaluating what has been done and closes his eyes to deficiencies, such a lack of self-criticism has a negative effect on the status of criticism in the collective: It is not developed. It is quite another matter if the leader has a sense of self-criticism. His irreconcilability toward shortcomings and his ability to understand and admit both general and personal omissions and miscalculations, draw conclusions for himself from them, and correct matters create favorable conditions for the development of criticism from below and for improving its effectiveness. In particular, the example of the leader's self-criticism prompts party members to

evaluate their own personal contribution toward common success with greater principle, speak about shortcomings without being cautious and overcome the shortcomings resolutely. In this instance CPSU members are convinced that their word will be understood correctly and that businesslike suggestions will be greeted by support and will be implemented.

It is very important to ensure that the example of a proper attitude toward criticism proceeds above all from the leaders. This was pointed out very forcefully by the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums. In examining self-criticism as an inalienable feature of the Leninist style in the work of leaders, the party Central Committee called for more vigorous development in them of a critical attitude toward shortcomings and toward what has been done.

We began to devote more attention to accomplishing this task. The indoctrination of leading cadres is examined regularly at sessions of the district military council. Quite varied forms of work are used to instill in leading cadres a feeling of self-criticism and dissatisfaction with what has been achieved: courses, seminars, party aktiv meetings, local briefings, and hearings of reports from the leaders about the state of affairs in their assigned areas. And always, no matter what activity is being conducted, we strive to make known to everyone the thought that a proper attitude toward criticism is a very important indicator of party maturity and principle of the party member-leader and a necessary condition for success in his work.

It must be admitted, however, that party member-leaders are encountered who do not heed criticism from below and assume that it undermines their authority. Such comrades must be reminded of Lenin's well-known opinion that readiness and ability to recognize and correct deficiencies which have been allowed does not degrade the authority of a leading worker, but increases it.

The political directorate constantly studies the status of criticism and self-criticism directly in units, military schools and establishments. This permits us to react properly to instances of indifference, self-complacency and inattention to criticism. For example, party meetings were held in one of the district's units each time after a final inspection. Party members would criticize omissions hindering the unit from bridging the gaps, and they would make businesslike suggestions. The commander also would have his say along with the others. He would admit the shortcomings and promise to take steps to eradicate them through his channels, but matters did not go beyond this. As a result the critical remarks remained undecided and at the next inspection the previous shortcomings would be noted, largely explained by his personal omissions. A careful on-the-spot study of the state of affairs confirmed that one of the reasons for its deterioration was the deafness of the party member-manager to criticism. A strict accounting had to be demanded of him for deficiencies in the training process and for inattention to criticism from below.

There also are instances where some party member declaims for criticism but as soon as it touches on his work, he gives it a hostile reception. For example, CPSU member Lt Col N. Tsvetkov always called on the party members to unfold

principled criticism and expose deficiencies. But then the comrade condemned his improper behavior directly and without beating about the bush, and just how did Tsvetkov react to this? In violation of the standards of party life, he personally decided to postpone the meeting to a later date and "prepare" it in a proper manner. He was strictly punished for such bureaucratism in party work.

It is correctly said that criticism is not honey, and it is not always pleasant to take it, but a manager is called upon to set the example of a proper, party attitude toward criticism. This is one of the signs of workers' political maturity and their deep understanding of their duty to the party and people.

The district's commanders, political agencies and party organizations perform constant work aimed at developing criticism and self-criticism and increasing their effectiveness. This does not at all mean, however, that everything is in good shape with us in the use of such a powerful and tested means of fighting abnormal phenomena. Many letters, including letters from party members, come to the district political directorate telling about various deficiencies in the personnel's training and indoctrination and their material support. Such statements often come from soldiers during unified political days, and the nature of some suggestions and complaints indicates that a considerable number of them could be resolved fully on the spot. It turns out that in some places insufficient attention still is being given to the people's needs, suggestions and critical signals. For this reason we must be even more vigorous in establishing an atmosphere of high exactingness in party collectives, an atmosphere of exacting demand on every party member for his assigned job.

This is even more important because some party organizations are doing little to improve the critical analysis of their own activity. Take the practice of preparing and conducting meetings. In some places their overregulation continues. How is it manifested? Comrades are given the subject of a speech in advance. A determination is made as to which of them will speak and for whom, what he will say, whom he will praise and whom he will criticize. It is clear that such actions have nothing in common with genuine democracy. The practice in question was condemned at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and it must be fought resolutely. It is only in an atmosphere of a free exchange of opinion that criticism and self-criticism can develop genuinely and their high effectiveness can be assured.

One of the necessary conditions for a further development of criticism and self-criticism is the unremitting concern of commanders, political agencies and party organizations for implementation of critical remarks and suggestions made by party members at party meetings, party aktiv meetings and conferences. Realizing this fully, the political directorate, political agencies, party committees and bureaus are doing everything to see that the party members' criticism is promptly generalized and systematized according to the problems touched on and receives a proper reaction from those to whom addressed. For example, many critical remarks and suggestions were expressed both during the report-election party meetings and at the conferences which were held. They were registered and control over their implementation was established.

The political directorate recommended that party committees and party bureaus discuss more frequently questions of developing criticism and self-criticism in the circle of party members and improve propaganda of the principles of party management, standards of party life, requirements of the CPSU Bylaws and rights and duties of party members. During work in the units and subunits, political directorate officers thoroughly analyzed the status and level of criticism and self-criticism in party organizations regardless of the questions being studied, and their effectiveness in accomplishing the tasks set for the units and subunits.

We also take into account that political agencies play a large role in the development of criticism and self-criticism. Principle in raising issues and the effectiveness of a reaction to critical signals depends largely on them. Take for example the political department where Officer A. Shibin serves. Party members of the political agency delve deeply into the internal life of the party organizations, regularly analyze their work aimed at developing criticism and self-criticism, give them objective assistance in creating an atmosphere of diligence and exactingness in their own collectives, and develop in activists a feeling of responsibility for implementation of party resolutions in which, as we know, the party members' critical suggestions and comments are reflected. Theoretical interviews held by the political department with the aktiv on materials of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, on the role of criticism and self-criticism in the CPSU's life and work and on the party meeting as the supreme agency of the primary party organization played their positive role. Materials of the all-union practical science conference held in Tbilisi this year were studied with the party members.

We realize that the problem of developing criticism and self-criticism is not divided by some kind of watershed from other problems in life or from the many-sided work of party organizations and political agencies. It is linked closely with questions of the development of party democracy and a strengthening of party discipline, and of course it is linked with the party members' political growth. The fact is that the higher their political level, then the farther they see, the keener they feel new things, the more irreconcilably they react to deficiencies and mistakes, and the more vigorously they get rid of everything obsolete and outmoded. In developing criticism and self-criticism, we simultaneously improve all aspects of intraparty relationships and thus increase the activeness, initiative and principle of all party members in accomplishing the tasks facing the units [chast' and soyedineniye].

Criticism is a very important means for improving the fighting spirit of party organizations. We see one of our most important tasks is to do everything to see that criticism fully serves the interests of improving the party organizations' work and strengthening their influence on all aspects of the personnel's life and combat activity, and we are devoting unremitting attention to accomplishing this task.

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## ORGANIZING ROLE OF STAFF COMMUNIST

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 83 pp 50-52

[Article by Lt Col G. Petrenko]

[Text] The party meeting in the staff party organization of Tank Regiment "X" was held after the conclusion of final problems and summarization of socialist competition results under the motto "Improve vigilance and reliably assure the Motherland's security!" Party members were given a good opportunity to make fuller use of results of the tankmen's combat and political training in analyzing the effectiveness of their own work and of party influence on fundamental issues of the military collective's training and service, and in evaluating the contribution made by each member of the party organization to the common success.

We will note immediately that success was apparent. The regiment accomplished the missions assigned to it and completely fulfilled socialist pledges, with no small credit for this going to the staff party members. As noted in the accountability report, the majority of them are genuine organizers of the training process and persistently strive for quality fulfillment of the combat and political training plan while displaying activeness, initiative and principle. Party members struggle against oversimplification and indulgences and they are concerned with strengthening military discipline, improving the organization of socialist competition, and generalizing and disseminating foremost experience.

Take Maj V. Plotnikov for example. The officer-party member is diligent in his work and bends every effort to cope conscientiously with the job entrusted to him. People in the regiment can't recall an instance where the communicators let them down in anything at all. They possess a high degree of schooling and they skillfully maintain and operate equipment. Despite the difficult situation in the last tactical exercise the communicators also coped there with the assigned mission and provided the commander with reliable communications.

It was quite correct that good words were said about Plotnikov at the report-election meeting. This person delves deeply into how officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki], NCO's and privates study communications equipment, how



the equipment is serviced and operated, and how the personnel of the subunit which is subordinate to him in service are living. He will promptly see something positive born of practice and support it. He also will notice omissions, he will analyze them thoroughly, recommend how to get rid of the deficiencies, and he himself will take an active part in remedying them.

The staff party member has a great role to play in organizing combat training and exercising supervision over fulfillment of the commander's orders and instructions. By combining supervision with effective, on-the-spot assistance, by revealing deficiencies and by taking specific steps to remedy them, he thus contributes to an improvement in the quality and effectiveness of combat training, to efficiency, and to a strengthening of discipline.

But do all members of the staff party organization act as the very same organizers of the training process? Does everyone regard the assigned job with a sense of responsibility and support diligence in work? In pondering these questions at the meeting, party members turned to last year's results, an analysis of which shows that the staff party organization did not always make complete use of the opportunities for reinforcing its influence on the personnel's combat training and life.

"Critical remarks addressed to the staff party members were made at the report-election meetings held in the subunits," said party committee member Lt Col G. Gudmanyen in his presentation. "Frankly speaking, the critical remarks were justified."

Some staff party members often would proceed as follows: They would come into the subunits, register deficiencies conscientiously, then report them through channels and with this consider their mission completed. The deficiencies of course were publicized and "lessons" followed, but in order to help people it is not enough merely to point out certain omissions. One must thoroughly clarify why they were made and what steps are best taken to correct matters.

Those at the meeting recalled the following instance in particular. Once the tank battalion commanded by Capt A. Nesterenko was given a low grade for a tactical field fire exercise. To some extent this was unexpected for many in the regiment. Previously the subunit personnel had shown good results in weapon training classes, field firings and tactical exercises. The opinion became established that the battalion had prepared firers--tank commanders and gunners--properly, but no consideration was given to one trifle, so to speak: Classes here were held in oversimplified conditions and a definite tactical background was not created in accomplishing fire missions.

It was noted at the meeting that CPSU members officers A. Bliznikov, N. Zelenov and M. Timiryazev, who were staff party members, had been in the battalion more than once during classes and had noticed elements of oversimplification. And what conclusions had been drawn by the staff officers from this? They of course identified the deficiencies but showed no proper concern for looking into the reasons for such an abnormal situation in detail or helping the battalion officers bring the training as close as possible to the conditions of actual combat.



To the party bureau's honor it did not ignore this mistake in the CPSU members' work. One of its sessions examined the issue "On raising the responsibility of staff party members." There was an acute, principled discussion on the important topic, with the party activists speaking primarily about the opportunities not being used by staff officers and about an improvement in their work style. Strict demands were placed on those whose sense of responsibility for the assigned sector had been dulled. CPSU members officers Yu. Klynkin, G. Solontay and G. Gudmanyman conducted individual interviews with those comrades who lacked experience in organizational work in the subunits.

A party meeting was held somewhat later with the very same agenda. The exacting discussion held there prompted all staff party members to make a fundamental assessment of their own contribution toward improving the regiment's combat readiness and to show activeness, initiative and diligence in working locally. Their attention was reinforced toward how the training process was arranged in the subunits, how the combat and political training plan was being fulfilled, how socialist competition was organized and how a struggle was being made for strengthening military discipline. They began to speak out resolutely against the slightest deviation from the demands of military regulations and against violations of established order or the methodology by which classes were held. At the same time the staff officers provided objective assistance to the subunit commanders in remedying deficiencies and saw to it that the experience of the best firers became the property of all tank commanders and gunners.

All this contributed to the fact that classes in the regiment (and particularly weapon training classes) began to be held with higher quality and at a high methods level. As a result there was a noticeable improvement in the tankmen's showing in weapons training. By the way, the battalion in question received a good grade for the last tactical field fire exercise.

Party members said at the meeting that this incident became an instructive lesson for many, but not for everyone, as time showed. During summer training it would happen where first in one subunit a class would be held at a low organizational and methods level, then practice would be disrupted in another subunit. And what did the staff party members do? Again they were playing the role of outside observers, registering deficiencies but not taking effective steps. Yes, that is how it was at times, which unfortunately not every party member admitted self-critically.

By the way, CPSU member Maj S. Dolgonosov took that position in speaking at the meeting. He concentrated all the fire of criticism on party members of one of the subunits who allowed instances where equipment was disabled. Well, the blame is not removed from the subunit party members, but a reasonable question arises: Just why didn't Dolgonosov say anything about his own omissions? The fact is, some driver-mechanics were poorly trained. The fact that some subunit officers themselves did not have detailed knowledge of equipment or the rules for servicing and operating it played more than a minor part here. The technical training of officers is Dolgonosov's concern and it was no accident that the party members reminded him at the report-election meeting

that one not only has to take note of deficiencies, but also see to their elimination and proceed from words to action. Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums orient us on that very work style of party members.

Speakers at the meeting said that we also can do a great deal for improving the propaganda of foremost experience. There is also something to ponder here. Calls constantly are heard to equal the best, adopt everything of value from them, and introduce it to the practice of training and indoctrinating soldiers. For example, Sr Lt I. Popovichuk, commander of an outstanding company, is deservedly praised in the regiment. No matter which staff party member visits the company he will express his satisfaction without fail over the arrangement of classes in the subunit, over the level of specialists' preparedness, over the order reigning here and over the moral atmosphere: The tankmen live and study in concert. And he will add that Popovichuk has foremost experience in training and indoctrinating subordinates.

But to this day none of the staff officers has analyzed just what is the essence of this experience and what should be adopted from it by other company and platoon commanders. The comrades showed no initiative or activeness, but it is about these very important qualities, which comprise the basis of diligence, that some staff party members often speak. It is the party bureau's fault that their words are not backed up at times by specific actions. As was noted correctly at the meeting by the party committee secretary, the bureau did not always show high exactingness toward party members. There were instances where comrades deserved measures of party influence for omissions in work and for irresponsibility, but the party activists would reason approximately as follows: It is inconvenient to call a person to account for whom the period of service already is substantial and whose position is a high one. The bureau also did not make full use of a form of party member indoctrination such as hearing their reports about fulfillment of official and party duty.

The tankmen are entering the new training year with the intention not only of holding positions they won, but also progressing further in tactical improvement. The regiment's personnel are faced with responsible tasks, and the staff party members can and must make a ponderable contribution to their accomplishment.

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## PARTY PLANNING PROCESS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 83 pp 81-82

[Letter to editors by Capt V. Burskiy and article: "Planning the Work of the Primary Party Organization"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

I was elected secretary of the unit party bureau at the report-election party meeting. I began work and the first thing I encountered was the question of how best to plan it. I would like to read about this in the journal's pages.

Capt V. Burskiy

The planning of party work is a creative, responsible job. A precise, thoroughly conceived plan is one of the necessary conditions for proper organization of the party collective's work. It allows the elective agency and every member of the organization to know the scope and character of upcoming work precisely, focus on the important element, and clearly see the perspective, and it gives the party members' actions consistency and purpose.

The central place in the monthly plan is occupied by fulfillment of general party decisions, orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, instructions of appropriate commanders and political agencies, and tasks assigned for a specific combat training period.

The plan's content depends largely on whether or not it fully takes account of the tasks facing the unit or ship.

In planning, one must be concerned with the conformity of what is planned with requirements placed on the personnel's training and indoctrination, on the organization of ideological work and on an assurance of uniformity of the servicemen's ideological-political, military, moral and legal indoctrination; and one must be concerned with the connection between ideological indoctrination measures and the personnel's life and combat training.

One of the key planning issues is the ability, at every stage in time, to find the chief element in the work of the party organization and see the most basic element on which one must focus the party members' efforts above all. It always must be borne in mind that the most important goal of all party work is the struggle for further increasing combat readiness.

A plan usually indicates what is to be conducted and within what time period, and it determines the persons responsible, with consideration of specific tasks facing the party collective. That is what is done by the unit party bureau where Officer V. Yablokov is the secretary. Its work plan is closely tied in with missions being accomplished and the fulfillment of planned activities is under supervision of the bureau and the party organization secretary above all.

A draft plan usually is drawn up by the secretary of the party organization, party bureau or party committee. The greater the detail with which he familiarizes himself with the missions facing the unit, ship or subunit and with the latest instructions of superior party agencies, the more objective and thorough his first outlines will be. It is also important for the secretary to examine once again resolutions of the report-election and subsequent meetings, meetings of the party aktiv and the party conference, and to chat with the commander and his political deputy and consider their opinions and suggestions. The secretary also consults with party committee (party bureau) members and the largest possible circle of party activists and party members. As a result the plan will be the result of a thorough understanding of practice and of a search for ways and means for resolving urgent problems.

After the draft plan has been developed it is discussed and approved at a party committee (party bureau) session or, in small organizations, at a general meeting of party members. It is very important for all members of the party committee or bureau and all party members to take part not only in compiling and discussing the plan, but also in fulfilling it.

A plan usually is drawn up for the month in a primary party organization but at times, based on the situation, the organization's work may be planned for a lesser or greater period. Plans often are contemplated for the period when sociopolitical campaigns are conducted or a specific mission is accomplished: tactical exercises, field firings, field missile launches, performance of operational readiness duty, and so on.

The party committee or party bureau and its secretary above all must ensure the unconditional and quality conduct of the activities aimed at implementation of resolutions of party congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums and decrees of the party and government.

A key element in implementing plans also is the accomplishment of specific steps contributing to fulfillment of combat and political training missions and a strengthening of discipline with consideration for the specific features of the unit or ship. The party committee or bureau is called upon to have a good knowledge of the local state of affairs and the nature of pressing

problems and to provide for sure ways of resolving them. This approach helps the managing party agency and its secretary maintain a focus on all issues involving an improvement in quality of the personnel's tactical, weapons and special training, fulfillment of socialist pledges and assurance of the party members' personal example in training and discipline.

An important place in the plan is held by questions of intraparty life involving the implementation of demands of the party and resolutions of meetings, the control and check of execution, the work of party members in trade union and Komsomol agencies and people's control groups and posts, and the conduct of interviews with CPSU members and candidate members on questions of party development and the Leninist standards of party life.

In conformity with the plan, the party committee or bureau conducts organizational and ideological work with party members and all personnel directly in the subunits. Therefore, the party organizations of these subunits are informed of the activities being planned, the party members who are the executors are warned in advance, and provisions are made for hearing accounts and reports on a particular issue by CPSU members, party organization secretaries or party group organizers.

New tasks often arise for party organizations which were not covered by the plan. In these cases the party committee or bureau makes appropriate additions to the plan, plans the new activities and assures their fulfillment.

Of course, a plan is only the beginning of the work. The important factor lies in the organization and the prompt, quality conduct of activities and in assuring the effectiveness of their influence on performance of operational training missions facing a unit or ship.

Party committees or bureaus are called upon to constantly monitor and analyze progress in accomplishing the planned activities and to inform the party members and appropriate political agencies about this.

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KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR ON POLITICAL TRAINING, DISCIPLINE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 83 pp 18-24

[Article by Lt Gen N. Makeyev, chief editor of newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "In Step with Life and Demands of the Time"]

[Text] Today we rightly say that we are living in a special time. Our country has entered a historically lengthy stage of developed socialism. and this demands an innovative approach from the party and all party agencies toward resolving a large set of social-economic, ideological and other problems.

The perfection of developed socialism, as was emphasized at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, is our strategic task. The country's entire daily life is subordinated to its fulfillment. There are clear, precise reference points which today determine the rhythm of each working day. Resolutions of the November 1982 Party Central Committee Plenum were a powerful impetus toward perfecting management methods and work styles and improving efficiency and discipline. The July Plenum provided an extensive program of action aimed at making all ideological work conform with the demands of the time. Our party's work to strengthen the peace is tireless. The Statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov on 24 November 1983 is confirmation of the Soviet Union's adherence to a peaceloving Leninist foreign policy and a fundamental course toward ceasing the race of arms, and nuclear arms above all, and toward reducing and in the final account fully eliminating the threat of nuclear war. Army and Navy personnel unanimously share the assessments expressed by Comrade Andropov in connection with the unprecedentedly dangerous, aggressive course of imperialism headed by the United States, and they are ready with all firmness and resolve to defend their country, its allies and socialism's achievements against all encroachments whatsoever.

These important party documents are constantly the focus of attention for commanders, political agencies, staffs, and Army and Navy party and Komsomol organizations, and they are the basis of all party-political work.

A fighting place among the varied means of propaganda of party theory and policy and of mobilizing military cadres, Army and Navy party members and all personnel for implementing the party's plans rests with the central organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which is

celebrating its 60th anniversary. This event provides a reason to look back and mentally retrace the "stitched front," the road of past years.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's history is linked inseparably with the history of the Soviet Armed Forces. The newspaper imprinted on its pages the stages in the Army and Navy's establishment and development. It did not just reflect what was happening, but actively influenced it.

Created at the direction of the Party Central Committee, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been published since 1 January 1924. It was called upon to become a genuine laboratory of military thought and foremost experience, and at the same time to be a spirited military, general political newspaper and not specialized, wrapped up only in a circle of special problems.

Having begun peaceful construction, the party simultaneously outlined steps for strengthening the defenses of the young Land of Soviets. An enormous amount of work had to be done in the Armed Forces. The foundations of military reform were just beginning to be laid down, structural changes were occurring in the military organization, planned combat training was being organized, a two-year program of political training and indoctrination for Red Army men was being introduced and a network of military educational institutions was developing. There was a search for ways of further military organizational development. The transition to one-man command on a party basis was a very important measure of the military reform. Strategy, operational art and tactics were being shaped in the new stage. In short, it was a transitional time and a special role in implementing the party's military policy was set aside for spirited, creative party-political work.

The pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reflected the uniqueness of tasks being accomplished in that period. Special attention was given to problems of strengthening the party layer among the troops; improving the spirit of party organizations, ideological conditioning of military cadres and the indoctrination of young party members; and including the command personnel in the conduct of political enlightenment among fighting men.

I would like to single out here a feature of party-political work such as its active influence on combat training and on forming a staunch defender of the Motherland. For example, M. V. Frunze wrote articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA entitled "The Army and the Academy" and "The New Replacements," in which he defined specific ways of preparing young military cadres. Well-known Soviet military leader R. P. Eydeman, in the article entitled "Remember Defense!" debunked erroneous views about the all-saving role of "Russian territory," which confused certain military specialists. In the article entitled "The Real Infantry," M. N. Tukhachevskiy, deputy chief of staff of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] posed a number of problems of the infantry's organization and of its tactics and training methods under conditions of an industry poorly developed at that time and a lack of modern weapons.

These are only a few of the articles of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, but they are very indicative. The major burning problems expressed in them also became the



content of party-political work. Political agencies and party organizations actively influenced command training. Fighting men and commanders were indoctrinated in a spirit of high combat staunchness and readiness to stand to the death for every inch of native soil. With respect to the article about the "real infantry," its discussion in the newspaper's pages went on for more than a year. It also went on in party collectives and at different kinds of command conferences. This contributed to an upsurge in local initiative and to the conscious participation of all categories of our cadres in military organizational development. The structure of infantry units, combat tactics and training methods improved as a result of common work. These measures later concerned the artillery, cavalry and armored forces. The newspaper raised many problems of further development of the Navy as well.

The next qualitatively new stage could be characterized figuratively as a period of intensive transition from an infantry and cavalry army to a machine army. In July 1929 the Party Central Committee examined the status of national defense and demanded stepped-up work in re-equipping the Army and Navy. "Be stronger than the enemy," stated the Central Committee resolution, "in two or three decisive kinds of arms, and specifically: the Air Force, artillery and tanks." Re-equipping of the Army and Navy required a certain realignment of party-political work. The motto "Face combat training!" became even more urgent and became a guide in all daily work of political agencies and party organizations. Day in and day out KRASNAYA ZVEZDA called on party members to be pioneers and leaders in mastering new weapons, and it showed how all mass agitation work in the best units was conducted around specific command activities in fulfilling combat training plans.

It is difficult even merely to enumerate the forms and methods of the newspaper's political influence on the accomplishment of Army and Navy training missions at that time. It is more important to sense the very atmosphere of this influence. It was transmitted well by writer N. Ognev, who sent his essay to the newspaper from a military sanatorium. He saw that even while resting and recuperating the commanders continued to learn and each one had a store of books. "We can't fall behind!" they explained to him. "This strenuous study during leisure time astounded me. I began to take a close look at it and above all I noticed that in the morning the commanders would hurry to the newspaper stand for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. On receiving the newspaper the commanders would immerse themselves in reading in groups or alone. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA would be set aside only after all four pages had been read. It is not enough to say that the commanders read the newspaper; they studied it. It was then I realized what KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was. It not only was an information organ; it was a systematic military-political manual for the growth of a Red Army commander. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA simultaneously was a special kind of combat weapon possible only in our country."

All these years the commanders, political agencies and the party and Komsomol organizations ideologically conditioned the soldiers, rallied them about the party and brought them up in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism and utter dedication to the ideals of communism. The efforts of Army and Navy party members merged as one with all party work of indoctrinating

our nation and preparing it to defend the socialist homeland. This work was unique, as was its result: In the prewar years the party managed to forge a generation of citizens which astounded the world with their communist conviction, exceptional courage and mass heroism in the fiercest fighting against Hitler's hordes.

The pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of the Great Patriotic War period are the annals of immortal exploits of Soviet citizens at the front and in the rear. That about which the newspaper wrote became material for the commander, political officer, party and Komsomol activist, and partisan agitator to work with the people; an agenda for a meeting, talk or rally; or the content of an operational newssheet or broadcast over a loudspeaker radio. The experience of combat and political indoctrination noted by the newspaper was returned to thousands of Army and Navy indoctrinators. The fervent words of M. I. Kalinin, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, Mikhail Sholokhov, Aleksey Tolstoy, Vsevolod Vishnevskiy and Il'ya Erenburg sounded from the newspaper's pages. Such articles as "Victory Will be with Us," "A Patriotic and All-Out War" (Kalinin), "Science of Hatred" (Sholokhov) and "The Russian and the German" (Tolstoy); the poems of Nikolay Tikhonov, Aleksey Surkov and Konstantin Simonov, widely known even today; as well as many other works by writers, publicists, military leaders, political workers and frontline heroes helped to explain Lenin's ideas of defending the socialist homeland and the goals and tasks of our people's armed struggle; to rally the people about the party; and to instil confidence in victory, heroism, staunchness on defense and a high offensive enthusiasm. Tales of the 28 Panfilov heroes, about Aleksandr Matrosov, about the defenders of Sevastopol and Stalingrad, about A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub, about the commanders' tactical art and soldiers' fighting sharpness, and the publication of letters from the front and letters from groups of workers to the front--all this, as well as much more, became a subject of discussion in trenches, at airfields and at halts on the march. Everything lifted people up for an exploit and everything worked for victory.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has the tradition that well-known military leaders and heroes of the Revolution, war and labor come to the editorial offices for evening ceremonies on holidays. Invariably a person who fought at Great Patriotic War fronts will tell about something personal and deeply felt, and will recall episodes where the newspaper inspired confidence in the days of difficult ordeals, helped one see outlines of the approaching victory more clearly, and taught how to fight the enemy better and perceive one's international duty more profoundly. Such simple human testimony is very valuable for us. Both veterans on the editorial staff and its young associates take special pride in the fact that the newspaper was awarded the Order of Red Banner for its part in the Victory and that it worthily performed the role of the party's combat assistant in mobilizing the people's forces and means to defeat a crafty and cruel enemy.

The war ended, years went by and a period of scientific-technical revolution set in which also caused fundamental changes in military affairs. It is generally known that reactionary imperialist forces made use of the achievements of science and technology for blackmail and threats addressed to socialism.

All means of party-political work in our Armed Forces, including the military press, turned to face the new problem and contribute to the personnel's indoctrination in a spirit of high vigilance and constant combat readiness. There is broad propaganda of the latest knowledge and scientific-technical achievements and there is a demonstration of those major changes occurring in weaponry and methods of combat actions which place special demands on the person in military uniform, on his knowledge, combat training, and moral-political and psychological conditioning. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents are the chroniclers of banner events of this time in the life of the country, the Army and the Navy. They told millions of readers about a new branch of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, and about the first space flights. They traveled with the renowned navymen beneath the ice to the North Pole.

The fundamental changes in military affairs posed questions of military discipline and supreme efficiency in a new way. The very concept of discipline expanded--it is the discipline of intense military labor, the discipline of competent operation of combat equipment, the discipline of operational readiness duty, the discipline of firm control... The personnel's indoctrination is becoming more and more differentiated and work along these different directions requires uniqueness and a search for the means, forms and methods of best influence on people's hearts and minds. As always, the basis and foundation for developing a worthy defender of the Motherland was and remains indoctrination in the high ideals of Marxism-Leninism and in a spirit of high communist ideals, to which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA always did attach and is attaching primary importance.

The newspaper pages of these years preserve the intensity of tireless work by commanders, political officers and all party members to ensure the constant readiness of Soviet soldiers, subunits, units and ships for any possible ordeal, for a rebuff of the imperialist aggressors and for defense of socialism's achievements. This noble work continues even today. Taking up a recent issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, one will feel the very same hot breath of military routine and one will of course see in it the reference points beckoning us forward.

Every Soviet soldier deeply realizes that today as never before it is important to keep his powder dry, to be extremely vigilant, to improve combat readiness and to reinforce our combat alliance with fraternal armies. From issue to issue, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries on an exposure of imperialism's ideology and politics and gives its readers a behind-the-scenes look at events large and small, "resounding" and perhaps outwardly not so perceptible, which are occurring in the world arena. The newspaper covers the practice of ideological work among the troops and the organizational and political work by commanders, political agencies, and the party and Komsomol organizations aimed at indoctrinating personnel in a spirit of high vigilance and at a merciless exposure of the aggressive nature and militaristic aspirations of U.S. imperialism and its unbridled slander against socialism. A reinforcement of counterpropaganda activity among the troops now is an especially urgent direction of party-political work. The newspaper draws the attention of organizers of party-political work in units and aboard ships and the attention of all

party members to the fact that the exposure of imperialism must be conducted on a broad front, constantly, thoroughly, persuasively and offensively.

There would appear to be factors now which are obligatory and which at the same time are favorable to a situation where the voice of our combat traditions resounds with special force in the personnel's political indoctrination. Speaking in the Kremlin at a meeting with party veterans, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov posed a question about how to make better and fuller "use of the experience of older generations for resolving specific problems of our time, problems which are largely new and which are difficult in a new way." Preparations for the 40th anniversary of our people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the important dates connected with operations by Soviet troops to defeat the fascist German invaders permit questions of the succession of generations, a succession of communist conviction and selfless labor for the sake of a triumph of our ideals, heroism, boldness, and wholehearted performance of military, patriotic and international duty to be posed clearly for the Army and Navy audience in a direct, objective connection between the past and the present. The newspaper tries to have every commander and political officer and every party member comprehend with all his heart the importance of this work. The newspaper allows young soldiers to take over the spiritual weapons of older generations like a baton.

The meaningful aspect of this problem acts in a close tie with the methodological aspect. I will quote a few lines from a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by Engr-Lt Col (Res) K. Markin, a veteran of the Armed Forces and a Great Patriotic War participant: "We people of the older generations do not simply have to bring interesting recollections about past battles to today's young audience, but also a profound thought and a great idea." This is a very true comment and it concerns not only the veterans, but also the substance of all work along this line, as well as the entire process of the personnel's political indoctrination in general.

In outlining the range of major party tasks in ideological work at the present stage during the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized that "even the most vivid and interesting propaganda, the most skillful and wise instruction or the most talented art will not achieve the objective if it is not filled with profound ideas, closely connected with the realities of today's life and indicative of the path of further progress." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents working in units and aboard ships encounter instances where the ideological content and the semantic, indoctrinational load of an activity is reduced in pursuit of an activity that is "lively" and "interesting." It is understandable that the quality of being interesting is mandatory, but the party is speaking about a unity of both elements when it demands freshness of thought and word of the propagandists and indoctrinators.

Performance of political and organizational work among the masses in conformity with the current tasks of perfecting developed socialism, tasks which moreover are being accomplished in an atmosphere of imperialism's sharply increased aggressiveness, demands that the organizers of party-political work engage in a steadfast, creative search, that they take a broad-scale,

system-oriented, comprehensive approach to matters, and that they have great ability. Two paths lead to this simultaneously--vigorous, competent leadership on the part of political agencies based on criteria of modern demands, and the ever-growing, businesslike initiative of party organizations and all party members. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA attempts to keep these matters within the readers' field of view and to give them the sharpness and novelty which the party demands.

I would like to mention in this regard the mood introduced to the editorial collective's work by the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Major responsible tasks stem from its resolutions for military press organs as well. The permanent reference points for us are to advance for readers major problems in the struggle for combat readiness, for improving efficiency and discipline and for perfecting socialist competition, the personnel's political training and the management methods and workstyle of military cadres, staffs, political agencies and party organizations; to propagandize foremost experience objectively; to uncover deficiencies; and, as emphasized at the Plenum, to defend state interests more boldly (and under Army and Navy conditions these always are interests of the national defense). It stands to reason that at times not everything succeeds as we would have liked, and there still are many reserves for strengthening the current and offensive nature of our articles.

Combat readiness of course always is constantly the focus of attention for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The newspaper has its own means for ensuring that the tasks assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy for training the Armed Forces and shaping the soldiers' professional and emotional readiness to repulse an aggressor reach the personnel's deep awareness. Readers will continue to find articles in the newspaper's pages about the experience of socialist competition initiators and problem-oriented articles about current issues of combat training and how to influence their accomplishment most effectively using methods of organizational and political work of the political agencies and party organizations.

The interests of the matter require that the newspaper, as well as party-political work in general, increase the offense against instances of lack of organization in combat training, eyewash, distortions of disciplinary practice, violations of the standards of socialist society and our morality, and inattention to people and the people's needs and wants. At the same time, an offensive spirit also must be displayed stronger in propaganda; in wide implementation of foremost experience of organizing duties, mastering military equipment and new combat methods, and the most effective techniques of training and indoctrinating personnel; and in a popularization of the best Army and Navy personnel. As the party points out, dissemination of everything that is best and foremost is one of the most effective ways for advancing. Additional physical inputs are not required here; only attention and persistence are needed. More attention to that which is foremost and more persistence in disseminating it is the task which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA journalists set for themselves, and the newspaper strives to draw the attention of organizers of party-political work among the troops to these problems.

There is one circumstance which today must have a special influence on the approach to all work by our cadres and Army and Navy party members. The party emphasizes that with all the importance of the other issues, ideological work is advancing to the fore more and more and that social, economic and organizational problems cannot be isolated from indoctrinational problems. There always must be an integral fusion here, which is assured by a specific ability to translate organizational, economic and other problems into the language of indoctrinational actions, and to translate indoctrinational problems into the language of organizational, administrative and other actions. Frankly speaking, this requires a certain break in psychology and the customary thinking of a certain portion of managers, party secretaries and the ideological aktiv. This is also mentioned during reports and elections of party agencies which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA widely covers. The newspaper will continue to use its articles to influence the formation of ideas about work style in the spirit of modern party demands.

And here is something else not to be ignored. The time is coming when we must thoroughly and profoundly analyze the results of an implementation of party guidelines about perfecting ideological and mass political work. Unfortunately, following the period of extensive, businesslike discussion of the demands advanced by the CPSU Central Committee, in places one senses a certain reduction in activeness in practical work. "Has a Step Forward Been Taken?" was the title of one recent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article devoted to problems of improving the effectiveness of mass political work. It would appear that today this question must be posed everywhere and must be heard constantly in every political agency and every party organization.

In singling out the signs of our times it must be noted that the very concept of the "party member's responsibility" has expanded greatly and become more voluminous. We cannot be satisfied merely with a party member's good personal results in military work or his diligent attitude toward party assignments. He is obligated to have a feeling for new things and to think in broad social-economic, political and strictly military categories, for our ideological-theoretical arsenal has been enriched with new, profound ideas of late. A party member must actively ponder how best to implement the party's innovative resolutions in his own collective. These resolutions concern the most varied walks of life: intensification of combat training, perfection of work style and management methods, reinforcement of discipline, development of socialist competition, and so on. The party member must not simply be, let's say, an admirer, but also a conductor and organizer of these new things in the masses and in his assigned sector of work. He must be an exceptionally competent, comprehensively prepared, authoritative propagandist in whom the word does not deviate from the action. When we ponder the conclusion of the June Plenum concerning the fact that ideological work is a job for the entire party and every party member, we must not see behind this simply an increased number of lectures, briefings and talks. This would be a mechanical, formal path. It is, as we know, a question of a higher qualitative level of all indoctrinational work. A real contribution here is demanded of every party member because those wide-scale goals which the party sets today (and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has emphasized and will emphasize this from issue to issue) can be achieved only through everyone's efforts.



It stands to reason that in combination these creative efforts represent the firmest basis for perfecting the entire process of training and indoctrination, for developing ideologically persuaded, courageous soldiers who are utterly dedicated to the Motherland, and for a further improvement in efficiency, discipline, quality and effectiveness of operational, field, air and naval schooling and the combat readiness of our Armed Forces as a whole.

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## IMPROVING MILITARY LEGAL TRAINING

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[Article: "Improve Soldiers' Legal Culture"]

[Text] A practical science conference was held recently in Sverdlovsk for political workers and military lawyers of a number of military districts and fleets on problems of the personnel's legal indoctrination. Briefings at the conference were given by Lt Gen N. Smorigo, deputy chief of the agitprop directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; Maj Gen Justice B. Popov, first deputy chief military procurator; and Maj Gen Justice N. Fedotkin, deputy chief of the Military Tribunal Directorate. The following article will discuss certain issues examined at the conference.

The CPSU and Soviet state devote constant attention to the development of socialist democracy, to a strengthening of legality and law and order, and to the indoctrination of all citizens in a spirit of a conscientious attitude toward their constitutional obligations and public duty. Very important tasks in the area of indoctrination of Soviet citizens and a further strengthening of labor and state discipline and socialist legality were advanced by the 26th party congress and by the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums. "The normal course of our social development," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "is inconceivable without strictest observance of laws protecting the interests of society and the rights of citizens."

The persistent, purposeful implementation of party guidelines is of great importance for strengthening military discipline, improving the political vigilance of Army and Navy personnel and keeping the combat readiness of our Armed Forces at the level of modern demands under conditions of a world military-political situation which has been aggravated sharply through the fault of imperialism.

It is important for every serviceman to understand thoroughly his constitutional obligations to defend the sacred achievements of the world's first socialist state and for him to fulfill the demands of Soviet laws and military regulations strictly and absolutely.

The legal indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel is a sure and reliable means for attaining these goals. It comprises an inalienable part of all indoctrinational work and contributes to the development of socialist legal awareness of the Motherland's defenders. Legal indoctrination represents a set of organizational, political and agitprop measures and is carried out in close unity with ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination.

In fulfilling resolutions of the 26th party congress, guidelines of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums and demands of the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Improving the Work of Protecting Law and Order and Reinforcing the Fight Against Infractions of the Law," commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations together with military justice entities stepped up their work of the personnel's legal indoctrination. An orderly system of legal indoctrination encompassing all structural elements and all categories of servicemen has formed and is operating in the Army and Navy as a whole.

For example, the arrangement of legal indoctrination work in the Volga Military District is typical in this respect. Here its content and direction are determined at all levels beginning with the district military council and including subunit commanders and military lawyers. Together with military justice agencies, the political directorate developed methods recommendations for the directorates, services and for appointed persons for organizing legal indoctrination of personnel in subordinate units. Legal aktiv councils are working actively in the military units.

The planning of legal indoctrination activities has become more system-oriented and objective of late. They usually are planned for a 2-3 year period in districts and fleets, and for a one-year period in units [soyedineniye]. These measures are included in political indoctrination work plans in units [chast'], aboard ships and in subunits. A number of places also draw up individual plans for legal indoctrination work aimed at strengthening military discipline.

Political agencies and military lawyers devote much attention to the methods assistance given to organizers of legal indoctrination: commanders, political workers and other propagandists of the law. They prepare and send to the units training methods aids, surveys, leaflets and recommendations on legal indoctrination, pamphlets, albums and posters.

It is generally known that an atmosphere of firm military order which has been established in units and aboard ships, and constant concern for the personnel's everyday life and people's needs contribute to no small extent to a growth in the personnel's legal awareness and to their development of a responsible attitude toward the performance of official and social obligations. That is why it is so important to constantly activate efforts for improving troop duties, building up military posts, and maintaining regulation order and a precise rhythm of the personnel's combat training, life and activities in the units and subunits as the most important condition for developing high legal awareness and preventing infractions of the law. Competitive reviews for the best military post and best training facility have given a good account of themselves in this regard.

The practical organization of legal propaganda now has become somewhat more diversified in its forms and closer to troop life. In units and aboard ships there has been stepped-up propaganda of Lenin's theoretical heritage in questions of the state and the law, defense of the socialist homeland, the USSR Constitution, and resolutions of the Communist Party and Soviet government aimed at strengthening socialist legality and law and order. An explanation of legal standards holds an important place in the set of ideological measures.

Questions of law and legality have begun to be studied in a more planned and objective manner in the command training system, in basic forms of the personnel's political studies, in the party education system and in military educational institutions. For example, in some districts around 30 percent of the officers are improving their legal training just in universities of Marxism-Leninism and in schools of legal knowledge.

A significant number of command, political and engineering-technical personnel are improving their level of legal knowledge in the system of refresher training courses and seminars. Attention is being focused on work with young officers in the Air Defense Forces, in the Carpathian Military District and in a number of other districts and fleets. As a rule, refresher courses and young officer days are held with them at the unit [soyedineniye] level. The plans for these activities include measures for explaining legislation and on the methodology of organizing legal indoctrination work in the subunits.

Legal indoctrination work also makes extensive use of such forms and means as practical science conferences and seminars, lectures, briefings, talks, theme nights, film lecture nights, legal knowledge study centers and reading rooms, verbal journals, and local radio broadcasts.

An active search for other forms of legal indoctrination also is being carried on in the Army and Navy. For example, the practice of a weekly information briefing for personnel on legal matters is proving itself in the Strategic Missile Forces and the Ural Military District. Question-and-answer nights and legal propaganda days, where commanders, political officers and lawyers speak to the personnel on various problems of Soviet law and where a viewing of films on legal subjects is arranged are generating great interest.

Party organizations are conducting purposeful work in the legal indoctrination of party members and all personnel. They are seeing to it that all CPSU members fulfill their party and official duties in exemplary fashion and in fact struggle for strict regulation order in the units and aboard ships. To this end it is the practice to hear accounts and reports from party members about their personal example and participation in legal indoctrination work. Commanders and party organizations assure that audits and inventories of supplies are held regularly and with quality by appropriate officials and internal auditing commissions; this not only allows omissions and deficiencies to be uncovered, but it also permits them to be remedied promptly and to be prevented.

Many Army and Navy Komsomol organizations are initiators in holding activities to propagandize the military oath and standards of communist morality.

The work of cultural enlightenment establishments contributes to an improvement in the level of the personnel's legal culture. Permanent schools of legal knowledge and legal lecture bureaus for various categories of personnel, the legal aktiv, members of servicemen's families, parents and students which are under officers' and enlisted men's clubs have given a good account of themselves. The arsenal of cultural enlightenment establishments includes practical science conferences, theme nights, film lecture nights, film weeks or decades on legal subjects, legal consultations and other legal indoctrination measures. Training methods offices, information reference centers and film libraries are widely used in officers' clubs to provide methods assistance to commanders and political officers. Libraries and reading rooms (or reading cabins) arrange exhibits of juridical literature, desks or displays of legal knowledge, and folders of newspaper and journal articles on legal topics. The Army and Navy press makes its contribution toward the servicemen's legal indoctrination.

The legal indoctrination work performed in the Army and Navy exerts a positive influence on development of a high sense of personal responsibility in servicemen for fulfillment of military duty and requirements of Soviet laws and the military oath, and for strengthening discipline and law and order. At the same time, it still does not fully meet modern demands. Legal indoctrination is not always accomplished together with political, military and moral indoctrination and at times it is poorly backed up by organizational measures for strengthening legality and order, by the arrangement of troop duties according to regulation, by the personal example of commanders and superiors in observing the laws, and by exactingness toward subordinates and concern for them. In emphasizing the need for social support of ideological work Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out that any kind of disorder, mismanagement, law infraction, money-grubbing or bribe-taking devaluates the work of thousands of agitators and propagandists. This also relates fully to legal indoctrination work.

The improvement of legal indoctrination is a comprehensive, many-sided task, the resolution of which assumes vigorous actions in all directions which consider emotional, material and organizational factors.

Unfortunately, legal indoctrination measures in some units and aboard some ships are isolated from the missions being accomplished by Army and Navy forces and do not give full consideration to the status of legality and law and order in specific subunits. A weak struggle is conducted to uproot negative phenomena which directly affect combat readiness. Some commanders, political officers and military lawyers underestimate the moral-political damage and danger of law infractions, and in some places they have become reconciled with instances of a distortion of disciplinary practice.

The effectiveness of legal indoctrination work is directly related to how the commanders and chiefs themselves observe the juridical standards of management activity and how they back up an explanation of moral and legal demands with

specific steps to reinforce legality and regulation order. Hence the need to continue improving officers' legal training. To this end we must make thoughtful use of commanders' and Marxist-Leninist training, classes in Marxism-Leninism universities and two-year party aktiv schools, and refresher courses and seminars for command, political and engineering-technical personnel. It is important to ensure broader and more differentiated training for officers in schools of legal knowledge in conformity with sample thematic plans of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. It is also advisable to provide for a study of lessons in law and in the organization and methodology of legal indoctrination in the lecture bureaus of legal knowledge for officers, in the refresher training system of management personnel, and in personal plans for political self-education and for improving officers' professional expertise.

The quality of instructions in principles of military law in military educational institutions needs improvement. It sometimes happens that military academy and school graduates have an insufficiently detailed understanding of USSR Constitution provisions concerning national defense and Soviet military organizational development, and they have a poor orientation in fundamental legislation which determines the procedures of military service. A more attentive approach must be taken to the selection of instructors of legal disciplines, a search must be made for additional opportunities to improve their qualifications, and wider use must be made of instructional methods assistance to instructors by military lawyers.

Problems of improving the effectiveness of legal propaganda are being resolved without proper persistence in a number of places. An increase in the number of legal indoctrination activities in a number of units and subunits is not always accompanied by an improvement in their quality or by strengthened discipline.

An essential deficiency in the organization of legal indoctrination work is a drop in its activeness as one gets down to the subunits--companies, batteries and squadrons. A narrowness and paucity of forms of legal indoctrination are seen here at times. Consideration is not always given to the fact that a majority of servicemen prefer active forms of legal propaganda such as theme and film-lecture nights and mornings, verbal journals, and question-and-answer nights. In this connection there is a requirement for an intensification of methods assistance to subunit officers on the part of commanders, political officers and military lawyers, and the inclusion of members of agitprop collectives and groups and the legal aktiv in legal indoctrination work in the subunits.

Practical experience indicates that a differentiated approach is not always carried out in legal indoctrination work and at times people lose sight of such categories as unit [chast'] administrators, battalion, company and platoon commanders, materially responsible persons, and the personnel of subunits located apart from the units. Individual legal indoctrination work with law violators demands special attention and improvement. The commanders, political officers, military lawyers, and the party and Komsomol aktiv are called upon to take a more active part in this work.

We also cannot fail to mention that a certain underestimation of the role of personnel meetings and comrades' courts can be seen in the legal indoctrination of servicemen. In some units up to 80 percent of infractions of military discipline do not become a subject of public discussion, courts of honor rarely perform preventive work with persons inclined toward infractions and amoral acts, and the party committees and party bureaus do not make it a practice to hear reports from party members who are in the legal aktiv. We must resolutely improve the work of preventing law infractions and create an atmosphere of universal condemnation of any manifestation of a lack of discipline in each subunit, relying on the help and support of military collectives and the Army and Navy public.

Commanders, political agencies and party organizations are called upon to show constant concern for improving the effectiveness of legal propaganda and its ties with life and the missions being accomplished; for assuring broad participation of command-political leaders and engineering-technical personnel in such propaganda; and for better use of the mass media and cultural enlightenment establishments.

One of the most important directions for improving the military personnel's legal culture is a detailed explanation to servicemen of Leninist ideas about the state and law and about defense of the socialist homeland, provisions of the USSR Constitution, and demands of USSR Minister of Defense orders, as well as the conduct of counterpropaganda and a well-reasoned exposure of imperialist ideology and the antipopular essence of the bourgeois state and law.

Formalism and stereotypes must be overcome in legal indoctrination work and the personnel must be instilled persistently with respect for the law, legal institutions and socialism's values, high political vigilance and irreconcilability toward hostile ideological subversion.

Legal indoctrination is a very important sector of ideological work. The primary criterion for evaluating legal indoctrination work is the level of military personnel's legal awareness and social activeness, their detailed understanding of party policy in strengthening socialist legality, and a clear idea about military duty and its faultless execution. The joint efforts of commanders, political agencies, staffs, military justice agencies, and the party and Komsomol organizations must be aimed at attaining this.

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## U.S. INTERFERENCE IN NICARAGUA

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 83 pp 78-81

[Travel notes by G. Stefanovskiy: "Nicaragua: On the Road of Creation and Struggle"]

[Text] Each day when they open the newspaper or turn on the radio or television set, Soviet citizens look for reports from Nicaragua, a country liberated a little over four years ago from the pro-American diktat of Somoza and which has taken the path of revolutionary transformations. Today this young Central American republic is forced to wage constant armed struggle against Somoza's bands and other counterrevolutionary forces encouraged and armed by U.S. imperialism. Therefore the excitement with which we greeted the news of the opportunity to visit the country of Sandino and Carlos Fonseca has to be understandable.

Then the IL-62 aircraft landed in the morning after a 20-hour flight at Managua's Sandino International Airport, bathed by a tropical sun. Nicaragua's capital greeted us with the warmth of friendly smiles and welcomes.

Managua is a city-hero which embodies the courage and heroism of the Nicaraguan people and their resolve to defend the country's freedom and independence in a struggle against the internal and external counterrevolution and to defend reliably achievements of the Sandinist revolution. It is the city where in 1978 a combat group of the Sandinist Front for National Liberation (SFNO), consisting of selected and tested fighting men, seized the National Palace when deputies of the puppet Somoza Parliament were in session there. It is therefore not by chance that the square where this historic event occurred now is named Revolution Square and mass ceremonies are held there. Managua is a city from which today leadership is exercised over the building of a new life in the republic and over a strengthening of its defensive capabilities.

At first glance Managua was living an ordinary, peaceful life. In these morning hours students and schoolchildren were hastening to classes, and workers and employees were riding buses or going on foot along the streets through which we were transported to the hotel. But that was only the appearance, for with a more careful look it was impossible not to notice that one sensed a military guardedness and readiness for armed struggle in the capital as well as in all other cities and villages where we later had occasion to visit. Armed people

often would be encountered on the streets, there would be sentries at their posts at the entrances to enterprises and establishments, and now and then military vehicles would rush by. Radar posts and antiaircraft mounts were visible on the dominant hills of the city and suburbs.

At the capital's airport there were bomb craters and the walls of a number of buildings had been riddled with fragments where, as is generally known, one of the air pirates took aim but found his grave. The remains of the downed aircraft rightly have been filled with exhibits from the Sandinist People's Army Museum, since they serve as a convincing proof of the expertise and heroism of defenders of Nicaragua's air borders. One becomes convinced at every step of the need for Nicaragua's soldiers and workers to keep their powder dry and to be in constant readiness to repulse armed provocations and aggression from the land, sea and air. We learned on the day of our arrival, and saw with our own eyes on subsequent days, the results of a raid by air pirates against the port of Corinto, where an aircraft downed by SNA [Sandinist People's Army] air defense gunners found its ruin in the coastal waters. We had an opportunity to meet with soldiers of the air defense battery whose accurate fire shot down the buzzard. They told us about repeated enemy attempts to disable this largest port in the country on the Pacific and deprive the Nicaraguan people of the help of friends so necessary to them.

During our stay in Nicaragua we presented a Komsomol Central Committee emblem and a book signed by Soviet cosmonauts to Pvt Fausto Palacios, an air defense crew operator and one of the heroes of the fight against Somoza's bands who destroyed another aircraft of the counterrevolutionaries in the northern part of the country. Later KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA printed photographs and a brief account of this fact. Later we were convinced on the spot of the fact that this aircraft was made in Oklahoma, as certified by a tablet well preserved in the wreckage.

In receiving sincere congratulations from the Soviet citizens on his first success and his "baptism of fire," soldier of the revolution Fausto Palacios said with emotion: "Gracias!" ("Thanks!"). And after a brief pause he added briskly and confidently: "No pasaran!" ("They won't get through!"). This war cry sounded like an oath. We heard it often, practically everywhere we met Army personnel, representatives of the people's militia, and peasants and workers.

Under the pretext of conducting the "Big Pine-2" war maneuvers, the Pentagon is widening and modernizing airfields and delivering tons of weapons and ammunition to Honduras for the counterrevolutionary army of surviving Somoza men set up and being trained by the CIA. U.S. instructors and specialists have taken control of air bases intended for making air raids against Nicaraguan cities and villages and against industrial and agricultural facilities. It was under CIA leadership that subversive acts were prepared and carried out in the Nicaraguan ports of Puerto Sandino, Puerto Seledon and Puerto Cabezas and in the town of Benjamin Seladon; a bridge across the Rio Negro was blown up; and the border point at Penas Blancas was attacked, resulting in destruction of the customs house and the deaths of three and wounding of nine Nicaraguan Army

soldiers. Somoza's cutthroats fired artillery and mortars against the Nicaraguan border outposts of Cum and Usama in Zelaya Department, and again there were human sacrifices. In the northern part of Nicaragua the border point of El Espino came under attack of bands operating under American leadership and with the support of the Honduran militarists. During the fight border guard personnel, supported by fighting men of the Sandinist People's Army, killed 20 counterrevolutionaries and captured a large number of rifles, mines, rocket launchers and ammunition with the stamp "Made in U.S.A."

On the eve of our departure to the Motherland we learned of a new vile crime which shook the entire progressive world with its cruelty and serious consequences. On 10 October 1983 counterrevolutionaries burst into the Nicaraguan port of Corinto (which a week earlier they had not succeeded in destroying from the air) under cover of darkness aboard a fast launch without identification signs. They fired on fuel tanks located on shore and caused a gigantic blaze which seriously threatened the city with its population of 27,000 and a number of foreign civilian vessels with cargoes and crews. The fire managed to be put out only through the joint efforts of fire brigades of Nicaragua, Cuba and Mexico as well as specialists from Colombia. Fifteen persons received wounds and burns as a result of the subversive act. The fire destroyed eight tanks with imported fuel. The damage done by the fire to port facilities was estimated at five million dollars.

Counterrevolutionaries armed and trained by the CIA are resorting to more and more major subversive actions and provocations intended to undermine Nicaragua's economy, to disrupt normal living and working conditions, shake the sociopolitical achievements and disrupt revolutionary transformations in the country. It was with all persuasiveness that the government of Nicaragua laid direct responsibility on the United States for the tragic consequences to which the terrorist acts lead and resolutely demanded a cessation of Washington's military and financial aid to Somoza's bands.

Nicaraguan Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega, member of the National Directorate of the Sandinist Front for National Liberation, assesses the existing military situation as dangerous for the country. The CIA exercises controlling coordination among the counterrevolutionary groupings based in Honduras and Costa Rica. At the assignment of the U.S. espionage department, enemies of the revolution tried to seize Nicaraguan border areas at a prearranged time and tried to place individual regions within the country under their control, including the departments of Boaco, Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Jinotega and Zelaya. But the Sandinist People's Army dealt crushing blows against these bands, the greater part of which was destroyed and the remnants fled outside Nicaragua's borders.

The concentration of major counterrevolutionary forces targeted against the Nicaraguan city of Ocotol continues on the territory of Honduras. Around a thousand of Somoza's mercenaries are operating in the border sector between the city of Jalapa and the border point of El Espino. They regularly invade Nicaragua in separate groups and then return to Honduras, leaving behind small bands which commit terrorist and subversive acts. Counterrevolutionaries

lodged in Costa Rica also function in a similar manner. They attack Nicaraguan merchant vessels on the San Juan River, which is the natural border between the two countries.

Armed acts by the counterrevolutionaries on the borders respond to the U.S. intention to provoke a military conflict between Nicaragua and neighboring states. The most acute situation has formed on the border with Honduras, where the reactionary militarists are giving the counterrevolutionaries direct support. The militarists have placed at the bands' disposal means of transportation and helicopters and aircraft which perform aerial reconnaissance over Nicaragua and supply ammunition to the interventionists lodged in the border zone. Honduran soldiers regularly violate the Nicaraguan border. Costa Rican authorities act differently: They take their troops away from the border, permitting the anti-Nicaraguan terrorist grouping to make bandit raids against the republic unhindered. Hundreds of Nicaraguan citizens have perished and considerable damage has been done to the economy as a result of the aggression.

Against this background we became convinced with our own eyes of the cynicism and hypocrisy of the White House assurances about the Reagan administration's desire to "settle" the explosive situation in Central America, which has become aggravated to the limit specifically as a result of U.S. military expansion. Neither the American president nor his closest entourage now makes any attempt to conceal that they are setting as their chief goal in this region the overthrow of the present Nicaraguan government and suffocation of the national liberation movements. According to ABC Television, the U.S. intelligence department ordered the mercenaries to consolidate if only on a small bit of Nicaraguan soil in order later to declare the formation of a "provisional government" there and to begin open intervention.

It is generally known that armed aggression against Grenada was the first element in U.S. plans aimed at smothering revolutionary achievements in Central America. This undisguised intervention exposes the ominous intentions of the Reagan administration. U.S. troops in Honduras, aircraft carriers and other American combatants ringing Nicaragua, and the arming of counterrevolutionary forces in Central America are acts of undeclared war against Nicaragua and the people's revolutionary forces of El Salvador.

From meetings and talks with Nicaraguan workers and soldiers we became convinced of their deep understanding of the acuteness and danger of the military-political situation in the country and region which has formed through the fault of the United States; about their high solidarity about their political vanguard, the Sandinist Front of National Liberation and Nicaragua's lawful government; and about their inexorable resolve to fight the aggressors selflessly to their last breath and defend at all costs the freedom and independence they have gained and achievements of the Sandinist revolution.

We had a talk with members of a labor collective which was youthful, but which had made itself known through good deeds, in an agricultural cooperative near

the city of Chinandega. They expressed a sincere interest in the country of the great Lenin. We also could not help but notice that each of the adult members of the cooperative had with him a submachinegun or rifle together with the agricultural tools. Pedro Medino, head of the cooperative, said: "We are proud of the friendship with the Soviet Union and will always be true to it. The country of the great Lenin is an example for us. Pass on to the Soviet citizens and their leaders much sincere peasant gratitude for the contribution toward strengthening peace throughout the world and for support and assistance to the Sandinist revolution. We will do everything to feed our army and will assist it with weapons if required."

We sensed the very same resolve to make a worthy contribution toward building a new life, to defend revolutionary achievements reliably and assure the homeland's security in talking with fighting men of one of the military units of the Sandinist People's Army. Many fighting men of this unit have participated repeatedly in combat operations, have been wounded and returned to formation to continue the fight for total victory over the counterrevolution. All the personnel came out to see us off.

We sensed the high patriotism of the republic's citizens and young people and their readiness to defend their homeland in an extensive campaign which unfolded in the country in connection with the State Council's adoption of the Law on Patriotic Military Service, in conformity with which young men from 17 to 22 years old are called into the people's army. The army was formed in Nicaragua after the revolution according to the principle of volunteerism. Now, faced with the threat of intervention, the country has been forced to shift to a new form of manning the armed forces.

During the days of our stay many thousands of young lads came to register at draft points opened throughout the country, recognizing their patriotic duty to serve in the people's army and fight enemies of the Sandinist revolution with weapons in hand. The lads did not disperse after signing the registration books. This day was a festive occasion in all populated points and everywhere one heard patriotic songs and music.

Call-up into the army begins on 1 January 1984 under the new law, but even today thousands of young boys and girls are joining the army voluntarily and departing for the border with reserve battalions.

I would like to tell about one other emotional meeting with the collective of a Soviet hospital giving the Nicaraguan people free medical assistance on assignment of the International Red Cross. People from the most remote corners of the country ride or walk tens or hundreds of kilometers to the Soviet physicians. After receiving medical help they often ask to be told about our country and the lives of Soviet citizens. With the readiness and sincerity inherent to Soviet citizens, the physicians and nurses answer the questions, tell about the world's first Soviet state and hand out postcards, pins and small souvenirs as fond memories.

As we learned, Comrade Hugo Torres, chief of the political directorate of the Sandinist People's Army, gave high praise to the work of the Soviet hospital

in a meeting with the physicians and other associates of this therapeutic establishment: "The hospital collective is performing much prophylactic and therapeutic work which is difficult to overestimate. But the contribution of Soviet medical personnel toward a strengthening of our friendship is even higher. They carry truth about the Soviet Union to Nicaragua's workers and soldiers and by their words and deeds they expose the bourgeois lie and slander. Our people call the hospital a reception room of the Soviet Union. The heads of the Sandinist Front and the government of Nicaragua also share this evaluation."

On leaving the country which we had come to like, a country conducting a stubborn, selfless struggle against the American imperialists and the counter-revolution and building a new life in the workers' interests, we carried away with us the warmth of the hearts of our numerous friends.

On returning to Moscow we read with satisfaction the Soviet government's statement regarding the aggressive U.S. plans for Nicaragua in which Washington's plans and actions are resolutely condemned and the invariable solidarity of Soviet citizens with the just struggle of the Nicaraguan people for an independent, free development of their own choice is emphasized. This voice of the great socialist power infuses new strength and augments the people's courage in their creative labor and heroic struggle against the imperialist aggressors and the counterrevolution.

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## MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF MILITARY HISTORY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 83 pp 82-84

[Article by N. Azovtsev, honored worker of science of the RSFSR, doctor of historical sciences, professor; and V. Daynes, candidate of historical sciences: "Military History as a Subject of Research"]

[Text] An important place in the inexhaustible heritage of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin is occupied by their works on military history, which are a scientific basis for proper resolution of contemporary basic problems of military affairs and for an expansion in the outlook of command, political and engineering-technical cadres of the Army and Navy.

A new book entitled "Klassiki marksizma-leninizma i voyennaya istoriya"\* [The Classics of Marxism-Leninism and Military History] prepared by a group of scientists of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military History Institute is of interest from this standpoint. It consists of three parts. The first part examines questions of Marxist-Leninist methodology of military history, the second part is devoted to an analysis of works by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin on the history of wars, and the third part studies the views of classics of Marxism-Leninism on the history of armed forces, military art and military equipment.

Proper illumination and comprehensive study of the problems of military-historical science is possible only on the basis of the scientific Marxist dialectical method. Marx and Engels are the founders of this method. They developed a teaching about the military organization of the proletariat which serves as a solid basis for a correct understanding of contemporary wars and the development of military science. Relying on the provisions and conclusions of the founders of scientific communism, the monograph's authors emphasize that development of a materialistic understanding of history by Marx and Engels marked the beginning of military-historical science in the true sense of this word. A characteristic feature of military-historical works of the founders of scientific communism is the broad political, economic, and tactical-strategic analysis of war and a study of the factors determining its outbreak, course and outcome as well as a study of social consequences. Their

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\*"Klassiki marksizma-leninizma i voyennaya istoriya," edited by P. A. Zhilin, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, 343 pages, price 1 ruble 60 kopecks.



works reveal those profound changes which occurred in strategy and tactics and identify everything new which each given war introduced to the development of military affairs. The detailed study of military history by Marx and Engels and their reinterpretation of it from a dialectical-materialistic position permitted them to lay down the bases for a new military science.

The ideas and views of Marx and Engels were developed thoroughly and comprehensively by Lenin, who rightly can be called the first Soviet military historian. Lenin's ideological-theoretical heritage represents a new stage in the development of Marxism in military issues and is characterized by the posing and resolution of a number of major theoretical and practical problems of the history of wars and military affairs, and by the development of questions of defending the socialist homeland and creating a military organization of a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat for these purposes. The monograph notes that during the period of imperialism and proletarian revolutions Lenin studied methodological problems of the origin and sociopolitical essence of wars and the development of military affairs. The thought should be singled out here that Lenin viewed the experience of military history in an inseparable connection and unity with the most important tasks of the struggle for victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for building a new society.

The book demonstrates the enormous contribution by Marx, Engels and Lenin to developing a general theory of military history, fundamental problems of the theory of building a revolutionary proletarian army, strategy and tactics of armed rebellion and a number of other issues which were the methodological basis for a proper understanding of the content and structure of military-historical science. An examination of the subject and basic concepts of military-historical science from a position of Marxism-Leninism gave the authors an opportunity to draw an important conclusion that it is a relatively independent science and studies the social practice of states, masses, classes and parties in the military sphere.

A detailed analysis of the study by the classics of Marxism-Leninism of the essence, sources, fundamental and derivative reasons, and patterns for the outbreak of wars of premonopoly capitalism and the era of imperialism indicates that the history of each specific war can be really scientific and genuine if its social-economic roots, political conditions and causes of its outbreak are uncovered in detail, if the real course of events is reviewed and recreated comprehensively, and if the results of military actions and their social consequences are studied.

The concluding part of the monograph gives much attention to views of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on the history of armed forces, military art and military equipment. It is to the credit of Marx, Engels and Lenin that, using the general sociological laws of society's development, they thoroughly revealed the class essence of armed forces of different socioeconomic formations and the scientific criteria for explaining types of armies. The authors singled out basic principles in development of the army, the first being that the army as an effect has the cause of its appearance in the politics of the

state or class striving to achieve or forced to achieve the realization (defense) of its interests through armed violence. The second principle reflects the relationship of the sociopolitical nature and combat might of the army to society. Marx expressed the idea of this principle in the words: "The entire history of civilian society is summed up with astounding clarity in the history of the army." Prominent Soviet military theorist and military leader M. V. Frunze noted that the Red Army is "an exact copy, an exact mold of our workers' and peasants' country..." The army's character and combat might are determined by society's economic, social and political order, by its spiritual life and by scientific-technical capabilities. The third principle reflects the relationship of the army's combat might to the nature of its internal elements and extent of their coordination: the number and quality of servicemen, the number and quality of combat equipment and weapons, and the nature and level of command and control.

Theses and conclusions by the classics of Marxism-Leninism about the history of the proletariat's military organization have considerable value for armed defense of socialist states. This question is given much attention in the monograph. It is emphasized that Lenin made an outstanding contribution toward elaborating the principles of Soviet military organizational development. Among them is the Communist Party's leading role in creation and perfection of the Army and Navy, the class approach, alliance of the working class and peasantry, unity of Army and people, internationalism, centralism, and one-man command.

The fundamental basis of Soviet military organizational development is its management on the part of the Communist Party. The CPSU is the first political party of the working class which theoretically and practically proved the conformity to principle of its undivided management of military organizational development. It is of value that the authors singled out a special paragraph devoted to Lenin's elaboration of theses on the Communist Party's leading role in creating the proletariat's military organization. The monograph notes that the Communist Party's management of the Armed Forces of the socialist state is reflected in the development and implementation of a unified military policy; in resolution of the basic problems of military organizational development; and in a determination of the most important measures and adoption of directives mandatory for party, soviet and military entities. The Communist Party's leading role was a deciding factor in the creation of the powerful Soviet Armed Forces, which repelled two invasions of the Land of Soviets by international imperialism.

Under present-day conditions and following Lenin's behests, the CPSU and Soviet state invariably display high vigilance and take necessary steps to assure general peace and to strengthen the defenses of our Motherland and countries of the socialist community.

The authors of the work being reviewed note that the experience of Soviet military organizational development and the bases and principles of this development as elaborated by Lenin and the Communist Party represent great value for strengthening and perfecting armies of Warsaw Pact member nations

standing on guard over socialism's security. This experience draws the attention of nations taking the path of fundamental social-economic transformations of society. It teaches the need for reliable defense of the revolution's achievements.

The book thoroughly analyzes the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the role of the morale factor in war. A conclusion deserving attention is that a very important condition for developing Soviet soldiers' high ideological conviction and indomitable morale is a detailed explanation given them about the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and its teachings on war and the army and about defense of the socialist homeland. The explanation of these issues acquires great importance in light of resolutions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Ideological and mass political work should direct much attention at seeing that Soviet citizens and especially the youth know the party's history and its work in various walks of public life, including the military sphere.

The pages containing an analysis of the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the development of military art are of interest. This monograph is the first attempt to examine comprehensively, in a generalized form, the theses and conclusions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on social conditions and preconditions for the development of military art and on its patterns and principles. It must be noted that this attempt was very successful and allowed the authors to delve deeply into the substance of the subject issues and make important generalizations which have not lost their urgency even today. Development of the military art is dialectically interrelated with economic, political and spiritual processes occurring in society. The level of development of productive forces and nature of production relationships play a determining role here.

A very important factor in the further development of Soviet military art is the observance of its principles developed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. The basic principles of the military art include maintaining a constant moral superiority over the enemy; precise coordination of all combat arms and branches of the armed forces; comprehensive support to combat actions; activeness, resolve and determination in the struggle for victory; massing of forces and means on a chosen axis; creation and use of a favorable friendly troop situation with respect to the enemy; and surprise.

The chapter on scientific foresight in the military area draws attention. The authors note that the classics of Marxism-Leninism created methodological principles of scientific foresight which allow knowing the objective patterns of armed forces development and which teach a proper assessment of changes occurring in military affairs and, what is important, a determination of prospects for their development in the near future.

The book's conclusion is of great importance for understanding the enormous contribution made by Marx, Engels and Lenin to the development of problems of military history. The conclusion shows the importance of works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism for the development of military-historical science. The authors direct the reader's attention to a number of problems which require further study.

A concise, annotated index of works by Marx, Engels and Lenin on military-historical problems is of much interest. It includes 108 works, including 12 works by Marx, 56 by Engels, 5 joint works by Marx and Engels and 35 works by Lenin.

The comprehensive approach toward revealing fundamental provisions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism in military history permitted the authors to show their contemporary importance, to formulate certain theoretical conclusions and generalizations, and to reflect the very broad military-theoretical and military-historical erudition of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

While evaluating the work as a whole positively, we must express a few critical comments and wishes. There should have been a clearer wording of the subject of military-historical science, a more thorough analysis of Lenin's views on the essence and character of civil war in the USSR, and it should have been shown what basic laws of its conduct he revealed and how the party used them to win victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The monograph should have elaborated more fully the problems relating to social conditions and preconditions of the development of military art and should have revealed Lenin's theses that in modern war the economic organization is of decisive importance: When necessary, the socialist economy can provide more than the capitalist economy for strengthening the country's military might. This thesis was confirmed by experience of the Civil War and especially of the Great Patriotic War.

Summing up what has been said, we must note that this monograph is an important contribution to Soviet military-historical science. It has taken one further step in studying the military-theoretical and military-historical heritage of Marx, Engels and Lenin and the reader has received a valuable, useful book. It unquestionably will be of great assistance to commanders, political officers, propagandists, and the instructors and students of higher military educational institutions in mastering the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and will contribute to a further improvement in their level of theoretical knowledge.

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